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ABSTRACT: What are the conditions on a successful naturalistic account of moral 
properties? In this paper I discuss one such condition: the possibility of moral 
concepts playing a role in good empirical theories on a par with those of the natural 
and social sciences. I argue that Peter Railton‟s influential account of moral rightness 
fails to meet this condition, and thus is only viable in the hands of a naturalist who 
doesn‟t insist on it. This conclusion generalises to all versions of naturalism that give 
a significant role to a dispositional characterisation of moral properties. I also argue, 
however, that the epistemological and semantic motivations behind naturalism are 
consistent with a version of naturalism that abandons the condition. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Many recent discussions of naturalism in ethics tie the feasibility of the 
naturalist programme to the possibility of moral explanations. In particular, it is often 
assumed that a necessary condition on a successful defence of ethical naturalism is a 
role for moral properties in good empirical theories on a par with those of the natural 
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and social sciences (such as biology and psychology).
1
 Such theories are taken to 
involve informative explanations of observed phenomena or patterns of observed 
phenomena that are not available at any other level of description. The assumption is 
seldom explicit, but once exposed can be questioned, and this questioning opens up 
the possibility of two kinds of naturalism in ethics. 
According to the first, the characterisation of moral properties as natural 
properties will only be possible if moral properties feature in good explanations of 
certain observable non-moral events.
2
 According to this type of naturalism, the 
question whether moral factors can feature in explanations of such things as agents‟ 
material success, or processes of social change, will be of necessary importance to 
those who wish to defend the existence of natural moral properties. 
3
 
According to the second, less demanding, form of naturalism the 
characterisation of moral properties as natural properties is not threatened by the 
possible absence of moral explanations of the same sort. For this type of naturalist, it 
may be an interesting question whether moral factors feature in explanations of 
agents‟ material success, or processes of social change, but the answer to this question 
will not affect one‟s position on the nature of moral properties.4 
 
In this paper I argue against Railton‟s influential naturalistic account of the 
property of moral rightness, on the grounds that it fails to meet the condition imposed 
by the first type of naturalism. This rejection is reasonable since Railton himself 
espouses this view. I also argue, however, that Railton‟s account might be salvaged 
were he to adopt the second type of naturalism.  
The rejection of Railton‟s account has wider implications for ethical 
naturalism, since many of the arguments used against Railton generalise. In particular, 
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they suggest that an ethical naturalist who accepts a dispositional account of moral 
properties is best not to be a naturalist of the first kind. My argument will initially 
focus on the case of Railton, with general lessons to be drawn after this case is made.  
 
One qualification before we proceed. I shall assume that both types of ethical 
naturalism accept that, at least in favourable circumstances, our moral judgements are 
responsive to the actual distribution of moral properties. Accordingly, both will accept 
the possibility of explanations of our moral judgements that cite moral factors, in 
particular, the very factors judged to obtain. Since the making of a moral judgement is 
a non-moral event (just as the making of a judgement about the weather is not a 
meteorological event) both types of naturalism will accept that, in this sense, there are 
moral explanations of non-moral events. The first type of naturalism demands, 
further, that in order for naturalistic moral properties to exist they must be involved in 
explanations of observable non-moral events other than our making of moral 
judgements – events such as an agent‟s material success, or processes of social 
change.
5
 It is this further condition that I wish to question. In §7 I shall return to the 
issue of how the weaker form of naturalism can account for moral explanations of 
moral judgements. 
 
2. Argument Summary 
 
According to Railton, facts concerning moral rightness are constituted by natural 
facts.
6
 Further, Railton holds that for any such account to be vindicated it must show 
how moral concepts can “participate in their own right in genuinely empirical 
theories” (205). These theories must also be “good theories, that is, theories for which 
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we have substantial evidence and that provide plausible explanations” (205). These 
and similar remarks (for example at 171-2) identify Railton as a naturalist of the first, 
more demanding, sort.   
I will argue, however, that Railton‟s account of moral rightness provides no 
reason to think that this concept will appear in its own right in good empirical 
theories.  
My argument for this claim is as follows. Railton‟s account of moral rightness 
can be considered as making one of two property identity claims. According to the 
first, moral rightness is a dispositional property. According to the second, it is the 
categorical ground of such a disposition. If the former, then to hold that moral 
rightness can play a role in good empirical theories is to hold that highly idealised 
counterfactual circumstances can be causally efficacious, which is implausible. If the 
latter, then Railton has provided no grounds for optimism that moral rightness appears 
in its own right in good empirical theories (given plausible empirical assumptions). 
Either way, Railton has not shown how the concept of moral rightness can appear in 
its own right in good empirical theories. (My argument actually focuses on Railton‟s 
account of moral wrongness, but it easily transfers to the case of moral rightness). In 
the penultimate section, I suggest that this result need not be fatal were Railton to 
adopt the second, less demanding, form of naturalism. 
 
3. Railton’s Methodology 
 
In his paper “Moral Realism”, Railton‟s aim is to provide a „reforming naturalistic 
definition‟ (204) of moral rightness. According to such a definition, the property of 
moral rightness is defined as being (identical with) some naturalistically respectable 
“Two Kinds of Naturalism in Ethics” – Neil Sinclair 
 5 
property. Such definitions are put forward, not as analytic claims about the meanings 
of the terms involved, but as synthetic claims about the nature of the putative 
properties those terms refer to. They are to be judged, not by a priori means, but 
through a posteriori consideration or whether or not they provide good explanatory 
accounts of the nature of the practices involving the term. Such methodology is 
required by Railton‟s „methodological naturalism‟ according to which philosophy 
possesses no distinctive a priori method able to yield substantive truths.
7
  
 According to Railton, the a posteriori assessment of reforming naturalistic 
definitions takes place across two dimensions (204-7):  
  
3.1. Constraints of function 
 
First, the defining property must capture most or all of the intuitive force of the 
definiendum (203-4). Every meaningful term of our language plays distinctive roles in 
our understanding and discourse. It is these roles that are reflected in those pre-
reflective truisms that surround the term. So, for example, it is a truism about water 
that it is the stuff that makes up the majority of the oceans. Likewise, it is a truism 
about moral rightness that judgements involving it are typically connected to agents‟ 
motivations (168). Any definition in terms of a property that doesn‟t fill these central 
roles of the definiendum will to that extent be defective. (It is possible, of course, that 
our intuitions concerning functional role are confused, so that no single property fills 
(or could fill) the roles that those intuitions demand – perhaps the case of ether is like 
this. In that case, any definition will be revisionary, but may still be justified so long 
as it can be shown how the function taken as central affords the best understanding of 
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the term and the discourse within which it is embedded. Railton‟s sees his own 
account of moral rightness as „tolerably revisionist‟ in this way (205).) 
 
3.2. Constraints of naturalistic respectability 
 
Successful naturalistic definitions are also governed by the criterion of naturalistic 
respectability. That is, the defining property must be naturalistically respectable. Any 
theory that hopes to offer a definition of a term whilst remaining a version of 
naturalism is committed to this condition.  
Railton provides a peculiar interpretation of what it is for a defining property 
to be naturalistically respectable that marks him out as an ethical naturalist of the first 
kind. For Railton, naturalistic respectability derives from the ability of the putative 
property to feature in its own right in empirical theories. He writes: 
 
What might be called the „generic stratagem of naturalistic realism‟ is to postulate a realm of facts in 
virtue of the contribution they would make to the a posteriori explanation of certain features of our 
experience. For example, an external world is posited to explain the coherence, stability, and 
intersubjectivity of sense-experience. (171-2) 
 
Later, having offered definitions of non-moral goodness and moral rightness, Railton 
reminds the reader of this condition: 
 
…[I]t remains to show that the empirical theories constructed with the help of these definitions are 
reasonably good theories, that is, theories for which we have substantial evidence and which provide 
plausible explanations. I have tried in the most preliminary way imaginable to suggest this. If I have 
been wholly unpersuasive on empirical matters, then I can expect that the definitions I have offered 
will be equally unpersuasive. (205).  
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Thus Railton considers it a necessary condition for his defence of moral naturalism 
that moral properties feature in good empirical theories.  
Good empirical theories, for Railton, are those which  
 
…contain generalisations that may not be strict or exceptionless, but that do illuminate functional 
connections, causal dependencies and other relations at a particular…level of description of the 
phenomena…[and that] afford explanatory insights that would not be evident at [any other] level 
of…description of events.
8
  
 
Such theories thus “insert explananda into a distinctive and well-articulated nomic 
nexus, in an obvious way increasing our understanding of them” (184).  
 There are two relevant points to note about Railton‟s version of the criterion of 
naturalistic respectability.  
First, a definition will meet Railton‟s criterion only if the defining property 
can participate in its own right in genuine empirical theories (205). This is to say that 
those theories must not be formulable except in terms of the defining property.  
Second, the availability of empirical theories that Railton‟s criterion demands 
is an a posteriori matter, to be determined by the actual process of theory-construction 
(204). He notes that the normativity of the notions he is attempting to define should 
not be thought to rule out all such theories a priori.
9
 He admits, however, that were 
empirical investigation to show that no theory in terms of his proposed definition 
could be constructed, we would have reason to reject that definition (205). Hence 
Railton intends us to judge his reforming naturalistic definition of moral rightness at 
least partly on the basis of whether, a posteriori, it allows for that concept to feature in 
its own right in an informative explanatory nexus.
10
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 The two criteria for assessing reforming naturalistic definitions come together 
in the moral case as follows. According to constraints of naturalistic respectability, 
postulation of a realm of facts is justified when such postulation brings explanatory 
gain. If the realm of facts thus postulated satisfies constraints of function for moral 
notions then they can also be labelled distinctively moral facts and we would have 
what Railton labels a “plausible synthesis of the empirical and the normative” (163).  
Railton argues that his definition of moral rightness meets both sets of 
constraints. The question, therefore, is whether Railton‟s definition specifies a distinct 
realm of facts that both captures the pre-reflective functions of our notion of moral 
rightness and plays the requisite causal-explanatory role. I argue that the second 
condition – the condition imposed by the first kind of naturalism – remains 
unsatisfied. 
 
4. Railton on Moral Rightness 
 
Railton introduces his definition of moral rightness by first considering the distinctive 
nature of moral norms. He notes that moral norms, including the norm of moral 
rightness, are distinguished from other criteria of assessment by being interpersonal – 
in that they are concerned with the “assessment of conduct or character where the 
interests of more than one individual are at stake” – and impartial – in that the 
“interests of the strongest or most prestigious party do not always prevail, purely 
prudential reasons may be subordinated, and so on” (189). These two features are 
captured for Railton in the claim that “moral norms reflect a certain kind of 
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rationality, rationality not from the point of view of any particular individual, but 
from what might be called a social point of view” (190). He continues: 
 
By itself, the equation of moral rightness with rationality from the social point of view is not terribly 
restrictive, for depending on what one takes rationality to be, this equation could be made by a 
utilitarian, a Kantian, or even a non-cognitivist…Here I have adopted an instrumentalist conception of 
rationality, and this…means that the argument for moral realism given below is an argument that 
presupposes and purports to defend a particular substantive moral theory. 
 What is this theory? Let me introduce an idealization of the notion of social rationality by 
considering what would be rationally approved of were the interests of all potentially affected 
individuals counted equally under circumstances of full and vivid information. (190) 
 
So Railton is aware that the equation of moral rightness with rationality from the 
social point of view is seriously incomplete, for an account of rationality needs to be 
given. By adopting an instrumentalist account of rationality (188) Railton takes the 
equation of moral rightness with social rationality to amount to the equation of moral 
rightness with what would be approved of by instrumentally rational agents when 
counting equally the interests of all potentially affected individuals and when fully 
and vividly informed. Thus Railton‟s reforming naturalistic definition of moral 
rightness can be represented by the following biconditional: 
 
(1)  is morally right iff  would be approved of by instrumentally rational 
agents were the interests of all potentially affected individuals counted 
equally under conditions of full and vivid information.
11
 
 
There are two further points to note about this definition. 
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First, the notion of interests requires clarification. Railton draws a three-way 
distinction between subjective, objectified subjective and objective interests (173-5). 
An agent‟s subjective interests are his current “wants or desires, conscious or 
unconscious” (173). An agent‟s objectified subjective interests are those desires or 
wants that an idealised counterpart of the agent would want his non-idealised self to 
want were he to find himself in the actual condition and circumstances of the non-
idealised agent (174). The idealised counterpart is an agent possessing “unqualified 
cognitive and imaginative powers, and full factual and nomological information about 
[the actual agent‟s] physical and psychological constitution, capacities, circumstances, 
history, and so on” (173-4). Finally, an agent‟s objective interests are “…those facts 
about [the actual agent] and his circumstances that [the idealised agent] would 
combine with his general knowledge in arriving at his views about what he would 
want to want were to step into [the actual agent‟s] shoes” (174).12 Thus objective 
interests explain the presence of objectified subjective interests, not vice versa (175). 
Railton is clear that the interests involved in the account of moral rightness are 
objective interests (190-1). Given his earlier definition of an agent‟s non-moral 
goodness in terms of that agent‟s objective interests (176), this entails that, for 
Railton, moral rightness is equivalent to “what is rational from the social point of 
view with regard to the realization of…non-moral goodness” (191). 
 Second, the notion of full and vivid information requires clarification. Railton 
assumes that the idealisation involved here is the same as that involved in the move 
from an agent's subjective to his objectified subjective interests (190-1). Thus an 
individual is fully and vividly informed when he has “…unqualified cognitive and 
imaginative powers, and full and factual information about [the] physical and 
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psychological constitution, capacities, circumstances, history and so on [of the 
potentially affected individuals]” (174). 
  
5. Response Dependence 
 
Railton‟s account of moral rightness can be considered an example of a response-
dependent account of moral facts, according to which moral facts obtain in virtue of 
acts, objects, situations or features thereof being disposed to elicit a certain reaction 
from a certain group of people in certain circumstances.
13
 Railton‟s view can be 
presented schematically thus: 
 
(2)  is morally right iff  is disposed to elicit [R1] from [P] in [C]. 
 
Where  is any putative bearer of moral rightness, R1 is approval, C is when 
considering equally the objective interests of all those potentially affected by  under 
conditions of full and vivid information and P are people that are ideally 
instrumentally rational.
14,15
  
 Though he doesn‟t explicitly mention it, Railton would presumably accept a 
similar schema for moral wrongness, that is: 
 
(3)  is morally wrong iff  is disposed to elicit [R2] from [P] in [C]. 
 
The difference being that for moral wrongness the reaction involved – R2 – is 
disapproval, so that where moral rightness involves a positive attitude towards , 
moral wrongness involves a negative attitude towards it. (3) is preferable to an 
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alternative view according to which an act is wrong when it is disposed not to elicit 
approval from P in C, since it accommodates the intuition (constraint of function) that 
morally right and morally wrong are contrary but not contradictory.  
  
 Notice a crucial feature of these schemas: though they provide necessary and 
sufficient conditions for an action to be morally right and morally wrong respectively, 
they do not tell us about the nature of the moral properties themselves. There appear 
to be two possible identifications for each.  
In the first case, the moral properties may be identified with the relevant 
dispositional properties. In the case of moral rightness this would be the claim that: 
 
(2a)  The property of moral rightness is identical with the property {being disposed 
to elicit approval from instrumentally rational people were the objective 
interests of all potentially affected individuals counted equally under 
conditions of full and vivid information}. 
 
And for moral wrongness: 
 
(3a)  The property of moral wrongness is identical with the property {being 
disposed to elicit disapproval from instrumentally rational people were the 
objective interests of all potentially affected individuals counted equally under 
conditions of full and vivid information}. 
  
 In the second case the moral properties may be identified with the categorical 
grounds of these dispositional properties, that is, with whatever it is about a certain 
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class of actions or situations that makes it the case that they are disposed to elicit a 
certain reaction from certain people in certain circumstances.
16 
In the case of moral 
rightness this would be the claim that: 
 
(2b)  The property of moral rightness is identical with {that property or properties 
of actions that make it the case that: such actions are disposed to elicit 
approval from instrumentally rational people were the objective interests of all 
potentially affected individuals counted equally under conditions of full and 
vivid information}. 
 
And, again, for moral wrongness: 
 
(3b) The property of moral wrongness is identical with {that property or properties 
of actions that make it the case that: such actions are disposed to elicit 
approval from instrumentally rational people were the objective interests of all 
potentially affected individuals counted equally under conditions of full and 
vivid information}.
17
  
 
Note that, on the second set of views there is no a priori guarantee that the set of 
properties with which moral rightness and wrongness are identified are unified by 
anything other than the fact that their instantiations elicit a certain reaction from 
certain people in certain circumstances.  
 
6. Moral Explanations 
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Given the above account, Railton aims to show how “moral rightness could 
participate in explanations of behaviour or in a process of moral learning” (191). So 
what sort of thing might the notions of moral rightness and wrongness be called upon 
to explain? Railton‟s favourite example is of social instability.18 He claims: 
 
Just as an individual who significantly discounts some of his interests will be liable to certain sorts of 
dissatisfaction, so will a social arrangement – for example, a form of production, a social or political 
hierarchy, etc. – that departs from social rationality by significantly discounting the interests of a 
particular group have a potential for dissatisfaction and unrest. (191) 
 
By „social rationality‟ Railton means what would be approved of by instrumentally 
rational agents when counting equally the interests of all potentially affected 
individuals under conditions of full and vivid information. Thus, a departure from 
social rationality is something that would be actively disapproved of in such 
conditions, that is, something which – according to Railton‟s definition (3) – is 
morally wrong. But since such a departure would seem to explain a certain potential 
for unrest, it seems as if moral wrongness has an informative explanatory role.  
 To simplify somewhat, the sort of explanatory role for moral wrongness that 
Railton is suggesting is a role in explanations such as: 
 
(A) Arcadian society is unstable because its institutional arrangements are 
morally wrong.
 19
 
 
The question is whether Railton‟s reforming definition of moral wrongness 
can be substituted into such explanations to provide the good empirical theories that 
his methodology – and the first kind of naturalism – requires. Given that there are two 
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possible property-identifications that Railton may be making, there are two possible 
ways in which these explanations can be understood. 
 
6.1. Moral properties as dispositional properties 
 
Take first – (3a) – the view that the property of moral wrongness is identical with the 
dispositional property: being disposed to elicit approval from instrumentally rational 
people were the interests of all potentially affected individuals counted equally under 
conditions of full and vivid information. The moral explanation offered in (A) would 
then be equivalent to: 
 
(B) Arcadian society is unstable because its institutional arrangements would 
be disapproved of by instrumentally rational agents were the objective 
interests of all those potentially affected counted equally under 
conditions of full and vivid information. 
 
The problem with this understanding of explanations such as (A) is that they cannot 
be understood on either a straightforward causal or dispositional model. 
 In the first case, the explanans in (B) cannot be directly causally efficacious in 
bringing about the explanandum, for this would be for a highly idealised hypothetical 
situation to bring about an actual situation.
20
 
Perhaps the explanans in (B) is indirectly causally efficacious in bringing 
about the explanandum. For this to be the case, the explanans would have to be 
directly causally efficacious in bringing about some intermediary which is itself 
directly causally efficacious in bringing about instability in Arcadian society. What 
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might this intermediary be? A dispositional model of explanation provides one 
answer. In dispositional explanations we can explain why a particular object 
undergoes a particular change by citing a relevant disposition to undergo just that 
change in certain conditions, given the assumption that those conditions are realised; 
the change is a particular manifestation of the disposition. This is the model of 
explanation at work cases such as: “The glass broke because it was fragile”. Adopting 
this model for the present case, we can construe the explanation in (B) as follows. 
First, we cite the fact that Arcadian institutional arrangements are disposed to be 
disapproved of by certain ideal agents in certain ideal circumstances in explaining 
why some agents – specifically, agents who have realised these conditions – 
disapprove of those arrangements. Second, we cite this disapproval in explaining why 
Arcadian is unstable. Thus the instantiation of the dispositional property – which on 
the present account just is wrongness – explains the disapproval, which in turn 
explains the instability. Hence explanation (B) is restored.  
There are two problems with this suggestion. The first is that, unlike the case 
of fragility, for the dispositional property of wrongness the conditions under which 
the manifestation of the disposition – in this case disapproval – occurs are idealised 
and seldom, if ever, realised. For the fragility of a glass to explain its breaking we 
must assume that the glass has been dropped onto a hard surface or hit with a hard 
instrument – that is, been placed in the conditions which help characterise fragility. 
Given the present account, for the wrongness of an institutional arrangement to 
explain disapproval directed at it amongst some group of agents we must assume that 
those agents are instrumentally rational and have reflected on the role of the 
institution whilst considering equally the objective interests of all those potentially 
affected by it. But such agents and such reflections are extremely rare, if not 
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impossible. Accordingly the number of instances of disapproval that could be 
explained this way is likely to be negligible. 
The second problem with this reading of (B) builds on the first. Given that the 
number of agents whose disapproval of social institutions is to be explained by their 
wrongness is likely to be small, it is highly implausible to suppose that this 
disapproval will explain any social unrest. As Railton himself seems to admit (191), 
and as I discuss in more detail below (§6.2), it is the non-satisfaction of a significant 
number of the objective interests of a particular group of individuals that is the likely 
explanation of instability, not the disapproval of a small number of ideal individuals. 
Thus even if we accept that instances of wrongness might explain some attitudes of 
disapproval among a privileged few, there is no reason to think that these attitudes 
will explain anything else. In particular, there is no reason to suppose that these 
attitudes of disapproval might explain unrest. Thus no reason to think that wrongness 
itself explains anything other than these attitudes. Thus, again, we should reject 
explanation (B).  
In sum, if Railton takes moral wrongness to be a dispositional property, 
explanations citing moral wrongness are either highly counterintuitive (in that they 
involve attributing causal efficacy to idealised counterfactual situations) or severely 
limited (in that the range of explananda is restricted to the reactions of certain 
idealised agents). In neither case are they able to be part of the good empirical 
theories that Railton‟s methodology – and the first kind of naturalism in ethics – 
requires.  
 
6.2. Moral properties as the categorical grounds of dispositions 
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Perhaps Railton would be wiser to identify moral rightness and moral wrongness not 
with idealised dispositional properties, but with the categorical grounds of such 
dispositions. Objects are disposed to behave in various ways in virtue of other „lower-
level‟ properties. So, for example, a glass is such as to be disposed to break when 
dropped in virtue of its microphysical structure (plus the physical laws). Similarly, a 
society is such as to be disposed to be disapproved of by instrumentally rational 
agents equally considering all objective interests in virtue of some „lower-level‟ 
property it has. For example, it may be so disposed in virtue of it having an unequal 
distribution of resources. The underlying property is the categorical ground for the 
dispositional property (173).  
 
Suppose, therefore, that we identify the property of moral wrongness with this 
categorical ground, that is, we accept (3b). On this view, the moral explanation 
offered in (A) would be equivalent to: 
 
(C) Arcadian society is unstable because it has certain properties that make it 
the case that: its institutional arrangements are disposed to elicit 
disapproval from instrumentally rational people were the objective 
interests of all potentially affected individuals counted equally under 
conditions of full and vivid information. 
 
Explanation (C) can be understood on a straightforwardly causal model: the 
possession of the categorical ground underlying the dispositional property can be 
taken as causally productive of the instability of Arcadian society. Given that the 
categorical ground is, on the present view, an instantiation of moral wrongness, such 
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explanations go some way to placing moral wrongness in the empirical theory that 
Railton‟s strategy demands. 
 There is, however, a general problem with this move. As previously noted, 
there is no a priori guarantee that the categorical grounds of the disposition to elicit 
disapproval in the conditions relevant to moral wrongness will share any similarity 
other than the fact that they all ground such a disposition. If there is no such 
similarity, then, under the present suggestion, the property of moral wrongness will be 
identified with a disjunctive set of properties having nothing else in common than that 
their instantiations are all apt to ground the appropriate disposition. Whether or not 
this is the case will be an a posteriori matter, confirmed by testing instrumentally 
rational agents‟ responses under the relevant idealised conditions. Railton, however, is 
committed to the view that such a posteriori testing would show that the property of 
moral wrongness is not disjunctive in this way, for if it were, it could not figure in its 
own right in the empirical theories that his strategy – and the first from of naturalism 
– demands (205). 
 To see this, suppose for the moment that a posteriori testing would confirm 
that the property of moral wrongness is irrevocably disjunctive, with the disjuncts 
having nothing more in common than that their instantiations in a situation will elicit 
disapproval from certain idealised agents in certain idealised circumstances. If the 
various disjuncts have no more than this is common, then we couldn‟t know, just from 
knowing that one of the disjuncts is instantiated, the likely causal effects of this 
instantiation (other than that the situation would elicit disapproval from certain people 
in certain circumstances). Since, on the view presently under consideration, 
predication of the property of moral wrongness would tell us no more than that one of 
the disjuncts of the set with which that property is identified is instantiated, then 
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predication of such a property couldn‟t tell us anything of the likely causal effects of 
its instantiation (other than that it will elicit disapproval from certain people in certain 
circumstances). Hence moral wrongness could not participate in its own right in any 
informative explanations (other than that its instantiation will elicit disapproval from 
certain people in certain circumstances). Of course, each of the various disjuncts may 
participate in its own right in informative explanations, but this would not be for the 
concept of moral wrongness to so participate.  
 If Railton is to maintain, therefore, that moral wrongness has, in its own right, 
a role to play in good empirical theory, he is committed to the view that, a posteriori 
there is something in common between all those categorical grounds of the disposition 
involved in the definition of moral wrongness (something in common that is, over and 
above the fact that they are all grounds for the disposition).  
  
Railton would certainly not object to the above line of argument, and goes as 
far as to welcome the fact that his account of moral rightness is constrained by a 
posteriori testing in this way (205). He is optimistic, however, that such testing will 
vindicate and not undermine his position. He is optimistic, in other words, that the 
various categorical grounds which are the instantiations of moral wrongness will fall 
into an explanatorily useful category. What might be the cause of such optimism? 
 A clue was given earlier. When introducing his preferred example of moral 
explanation, Railton claims that:  
 
…a social arrangement…that departs from social rationality by significantly discounting 
the [objective] interests of a particular group [will] have a potential for dissatisfaction 
and unrest. (191, emphasis added.) 
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Situations that depart from social rationality, remember, are situations would be 
disapproved of by instrumentally rational agents when counting equally the interests 
of all potentially affected individuals under conditions of full and vivid information, 
in other words, situations that are morally wrong. So Railton is here giving one way in 
which situations might be morally wrong: by significantly discounting the objective 
interests of a particular group. Assuming that situations that involve the significant 
discounting of the objective interests of a particular group have a potential for 
dissatisfaction and unrest, it follows that situations that are morally wrong in this way 
will be prone to dissatisfaction and unrest. 
 Unfortunately this will not suffice to show that moral wrongness is itself an 
explanatorily useful category, since for all that has been said, there may be situations 
that are wrong in ways other than significantly discounting of the objective interests 
of an group. Such situations, though morally wrong, will not on this account have any 
potential for dissatisfaction and unrest. To avoid this difficulty, Railton might claim 
that every situation which is morally wrong involves the significant discounting of the 
objective interests of some group. If all situations of moral wrongness involve the 
discounting of the objective interests of some (groups of) people, and if in all 
situations in which some peoples‟ objective interests are discounted those people have 
a tendency for dissatisfaction, then it follows that whenever there is moral wrongness 
there will be a tendency for social unrest. Hence explanation (A) would be vindicated 
and the property of moral wrongness could play a part in its own right in a good 
empirical theory.  
It is debatable, however, how far this would go to placing the property of 
moral wrongness in an informative explanatory nexus such as Railton‟s strategy 
demands. For clearly, in such a case, the causal work is being done by the property of 
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being such as to discount the objective interests of some (group of) people, and not by 
the property of moral wrongness. For comparison, consider that every situation in 
which an object is coloured is a situation in which the object has a mass, but the 
colour of the object will not help explain why the object is subject to a constant 
gravitational force.  
Railton‟s position might be saved if he were to make a still stronger claim – 
not only that every situation which is morally wrong involves the significant 
discounting of the objective interests of some affected group of people, but that the 
property of moral wrongness is simply identical with the property of being such as to 
discount the objective interests of some (groups of) people. Given the present 
interpretation of Railton‟s view  (3b)  this amounts to the claim that the property 
that (alone and always) grounds the disposition of situations to elicit disapproval from 
instrumentally rational people when considering equally the objective interests of all 
potentially affected individuals under conditions of full and vivid information is the 
property of being such as to significantly discount the interests of some affected group 
of people. In which case, the causal work that being done by the latter property is ex 
hypothesi the same work that is done by the moral property.
21
 Since the property of 
being such as to discount the objective interests of some (groups of) people is causally 
explanatory, then, given such an identification, so is the property of moral wrongness.  
Unfortunately for Railton, this approach fails. To be successful, it would need 
to defend the following two claims: 
(4) The property of moral wrongness is identical with the property of being 
such as to discount the objective interests of some groups of people. 
(5) The property of being such as to discount the objective interests of some 
groups of people is an informative explanatory property. 
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 To assess these claims, it is necessary to enquire into what it is for interests to 
be „discounted‟. There appear to be three reasonable candidates. In the first case, we 
may say that interests are discounted when they are frustrated, or go unsatisfied. A 
food distribution system that fails to ensure that every member of a society is properly 
nourished would be discounting interests in this sense. In the second case, we may say 
that interests are discounted when they are not considered in processes of deciding 
what to approve or disapprove of, or more broadly, in processes of decision-making. 
A law-making body that failed to consider the interests of the elderly, or of the young, 
in deciding which laws to enact would be discounting interests in this sense. In the 
third case, we may say that interests are discounted when they both go unsatisfied and 
fail to be considered in processes of decision-making. A ruling body that failed to 
consider the interests of the elderly in forming seasonal policy, resulting in many of 
that group dying due to under-heated homes during winter, would be discounting 
interests in this third sense. Unfortunately, on none of these three interpretations of 
„discounting interests‟ has Railton done enough to support both claims (4) and (5).  
 First, suppose we mean by „discounting interests‟ simply not satisfying them. 
Following this interpretation, together with the definition of moral wrongness (3b), 
the claim (4) amounts to: 
(4a)  The property that makes it the case that: a situation would be 
disapproved of by instrumentally rational agents when considering 
equally the objective interests of all those potentially affected under 
conditions of full and vivid information is identical with the property 
of being such as not satisfy the objective interests of some groups of 
affected people. 
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This property identity claim is implausible. It is implausible because there may 
be situations in which the objective interests of some groups of people would not be 
satisfied, but that would not be disapproved of by instrumentally rational people when 
considering equally the objective interests of all those potentially affected under 
conditions of full and vivid information (indeed, that might even be approved of). 
Consider that in any social situation, it seems likely that peoples‟ objective interests 
would diverge considerably, and that, furthermore, there may be no way in which that 
society could be organised that guarantees that the objective interests of all its citizens 
were satisfied. A ruling body, therefore, might quite possibly be in a situation where, 
whatever it does, the objective interests of some subset of its citizens would remain 
unsatisfied. Nevertheless, there may still be some decisions of such a body that would 
not be disapproved of by instrumentally rational people considering equally the 
objective interests of all potentially affected individuals under conditions of full and 
vivid information (indeed, some decisions may even be approved by such people – 
perhaps because they ensure the highest possible number of objective interests are 
satisfied). It follows that the property of being such as to not satisfy the objective 
interests of some groups of affected people is not identical with the property that 
makes it that case that a situation would be disapproved of by instrumentally rational 
agents when considering equally the objective interests of all those potentially 
affected under conditions of full and vivid information. Thus, on this interpretation, 
the property identity fails and claim (4) is false. 
 Suppose, alternatively, we mean by „discounting interests‟ not counting them 
equally. In that case the property identity is more plausible: it seems probable that any 
social arrangement which fails to count equally the interests of all those potentially 
affected would be disapproved of by instrumentally rational agents when considering 
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equally the objective interests of all those potentially affected. What such agents 
would disapprove of is, of course, an a posteriori matter, but let‟s grant Railton this 
claim for the sake of argument. Unfortunately, on this view of „discounting‟, the 
second claim is no longer plausible. On this interpretation, (5) amounts to: 
(5a) The property of being such as to not count equally the objective 
interests of some groups of people is explanatorily informative. 
The problem is that it is the category of not satisfying objective interests, not the 
category of simply not counting them equally, that is the plausible explanatory 
category. Consider a situation that does not count equally the objective interests of 
some groups of people yet still satisfies those interests. For example, a particularly 
affluent society may have a law-making body that considers only the interests of high-
earners in forming its decisions, yet that on this basis enacts laws that result in the 
satisfaction of the objective interests of all members of society. Such a situation 
would not be prone to satisfaction or unrest. Thus the property of being such as to not 
count equally the objective interests of some groups of people cannot be involved in 
the explanation of any social dissatisfaction or unrest. Thus on this interpretation the 
explanatory claim fails, and claim (5) is false.  
 Finally, suppose we mean by „discounting interests‟ both not satisfying them 
and failing to consider them in processes of decision-making. Once again, that would 
make the property identity plausible: it seems probable any social arrangement which 
fails to count equally the interests of all those potentially affected and thereby leaves 
many interests unsatisfied would be disapproved of by instrumentally rational agents 
when considering equally the objective interests of all those potentially affected. This 
identity claim is, of course, incompatible with the one accepted for the sake of 
argument when discussing the second sense of „discounting interests‟, so Railton can 
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only accept one of them. Unfortunately, accepting either leaves Railton‟s claim (5) 
unsupported. On this final interpretation, (5) amounts to: 
(5b) The property of being such as to both not count equally the objective 
interests of some group of people and leave those interests unsatisfied 
is explanatorily informative. 
The problem here is the similar to that facing (5a): it is the simple category of 
not satisfying objective interests, not any more complex category of both not 
satisfying and not counting equally objective interests, that is the plausible 
explanatory category. Consider two situations, both of which leave the objective 
interests of a significant group of people unsatisfied, but only one of which includes a 
consideration of those interests in its decision-making procedures. In this latter case, 
that their names are mentioned in the Halls of Power will be scarcely much 
consolation to those whose objective interests continue to be frustrated. Thus the 
tendency for instability will be just as strong in both cases. Thus, it is the simple 
category of not satisfying objective interests, and not any more complex conjunctive 
category, that is explanatorily informative. Hence (5b) is false. On no interpretation of 
„discounting interests‟, therefore, has Railton provided sufficient a posteriori grounds 
to believe that the property of moral wrongness – when identified with the categorical 
grounds of the disposition he specifies – is an explanatorily informative property. 
Once again, therefore, Railton has not provided sufficient reason to think that moral 
properties play a part in the good empirical theories which his methodology – and the 
first kind of naturalism in ethics – requires.  
 
It is important to note that the arguments of the last two sections against 
Railton are not of mere parochial interest. They contain general arguments against any 
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naturalist who hopes to account for moral properties in dispositional terms and who 
accepts the condition on naturalistic respectability imposed by the first kind of 
naturalism in ethics.
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 Such views face the same choice I posed for Railton: either 
identify moral properties with the dispositional properties themselves, or with the 
categorical grounds of those dispositions. In the first case, it is a general point that 
should the conditions specified in the disposition be idealised or otherwise 
uncommon, little explanatory force will accrue to moral properties (§6.1). In the 
second case, it is likewise a general truth that there can be no a priori guarantee that 
those grounds themselves fall into an explanatorily informative category, and hence 
no a priori guarantee that moral properties, thus identified, are themselves 
explanatorily informative (§6.2). Railton recognises this deficit, and provides the 
beginning of some a posteriori considerations to support his belief in the explanatory 
potency of moral properties. I have argued that these considerations are not 
persuasive. But the need to provide them is incumbent on any naturalist who takes 
this path.  
These general points amount to a presumptive case against the possibility of 
naturalists providing both a dispositional account of moral properties and a defence of 
the claim that those same properties play an informative explanatory role of the type 
demanded by the first kind of naturalism in ethics. It is worthwhile considering, 
therefore, how the naturalist might escape this inconsistency. In the next section, I 
will consider the prospects for ethical naturalism were it to drop the condition 
imposed by the first kind of naturalism in ethics.
23
  
 
7. Other Moral Explanations 
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I have argued that Railton‟s reforming definition of moral wrongness – as captured by 
(3) – can be understood as making one of two property identifications. On neither 
understanding, however, has Railton shown how such a property can participate in the 
good empirical theories that his methodology – and the first form of naturalism – 
requires. A closely parallel argument also counts against Railton‟s definition of moral 
rightness.  
   
 One response to these arguments is to hold fast to Railton‟s methodology – 
and hence the constraint imposed by the first type of naturalism in ethics – and reject 
his definitions. An alternative response is to reject Railton‟s methodology and move 
to the second kind of naturalism in ethics.
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 Below, I suggest that this response is 
consistent with the underlying motives for Railton‟s naturalism.  
 
 What are the advantages of defining a concept in terms of a naturalistically 
respectable property? Besides simplifying ontology, the key benefit, as recognised by 
Railton, is that it makes available naturalistic accounts of our semantic and 
epistemological access to the property thus defined (205).
25
 For any domain of 
putative properties which we claim to discourse meaningfully about, we must be able 
to show both how our terms can get to refer to such properties and how, in favourable 
cases, we might have knowledge of them. If the properties of the domain are 
naturalistically respectable, then the possibility arises that our access to such 
properties is a result of being related to them in some naturalistically respectable way 
– causally, perhaps. For example, there appears to be an explanatory constraint on 
epistemic access to a domain of facts according to which one can only be said to 
know that p if that very fact can play some part in the explanation of one‟s belief that 
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p.
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 If p is a natural fact then this explanation can be part of a causal empirical theory, 
and our epistemic access to the realm of facts is explained naturalistically.  
 If this is the motivation behind defining moral properties in naturalistically 
respectable terms, however, it doesn‟t entail that those properties should participate in 
their own right in well-articulated nomic nexus that afford explanatory insight into 
non-moral phenomena. All that is required is that we can offer particular explanations 
in instances whenever we are semantically or epistemologically in contact with those 
properties. An example of the epistemological sort will help make this clear. 
 Suppose that Donnie believes that  is morally right, and does so because he 
has been taught this at his mother‟s knee. Suppose that in actual (moral) fact, it is not 
the case that  is morally right, rather,  is morally right. According to Railton‟s 
account of moral rightness (1), what makes  right is that it would be approved of by 
instrumentally rational people when considering equally the objective interests of all 
potentially affected individuals under conditions of full and vivid information. 
Suppose that Donnie comes to realise this, that is, comes to realise that  would be 
approved of by such people in such conditions. This realisation may the result of 
Donnie himself coming to meet such conditions and sharing the approval, or 
indirectly by realising that someone else has come to satisfy them and share the 
approval. There is no reason to suppose that this realisation will cause Donnie to alter 
his moral evaluation of  (and ), but if it does, that is, if it causes Donnie to stop 
believing that  is morally right and start believing that  is morally right, then we 
might offer the following explanation of Donnie‟s resultant belief: 
 
(D) Donnie believes that  is morally right because  is such as to elicit 
approval from instrumentally rational people when considering equally 
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the objective interests of all potentially affected individuals under 
conditions of full and vivid information and Donnie has come to realise 
this. 
 
Given Railton‟s naturalistic definition of moral rightness (1), this explanation is 
equivalent to: 
 
(E) Donnie believes that  is morally right because  is morally right and 
Donnie has come to realise this. 
 
Notice that in (E) the property of being morally right has a genuine explanatory role 
to play in the evolution of Donnie‟s belief – Donnie‟s belief has successfully „tracked‟ 
the responses of instrumentally rational people when in the relevant idealised 
situation.
27
 Since this is what, on Railton‟s view, defines moral rightness, Donnie's 
belief has successfully tracked the property of moral rightness. This property therefore 
plays a role in the explanation of his belief. 
 However, though such explanations allow properties such as moral rightness 
explain things such as Donnie‟s belief, this is far from the type of explanation 
required by the first type of naturalism in ethics. For that type of naturalism –
embraced by Railton – requires that moral properties are causally explanatorily 
independent of their effects on agents‟ moral judgements. Therefore, even if Donnie‟s 
belief were to be causally explanatory of some non-moral event, this would not be 
sufficient for moral rightness to satisfy the condition on naturalistic respectability 
imposed by the first kind of naturalism in ethics.  
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Nevertheless explanations such as (E) do satisfy one of Railton‟s desiderata, namely 
they allow the moral realist to employ naturalistic accounts of how we come to have 
knowledge of moral truths, since they can be interpreted as providing naturalistic 
explanations that meet the explanatory constraint on epistemic access. The moral 
realist who accepts Railton‟s account of moral rightness, therefore, can accommodate 
the insights of a naturalistic epistemology (and naturalistic semantics) without 
necessarily meeting Railton‟s more stringent criterion of naturalistic respectability. In 
other words, he can accept Railton‟s definitions so long as he becomes a naturalist of 
the second, less demanding, sort.  
 
8. Conclusion 
 
I have argued that Railton‟s definitions of moral rightness and moral wrongness fail 
on his own terms. They fail because they do not show how either property can play a 
role in good empirical theories on a par with those theories of the natural and social 
sciences. They thus fail to meet a condition on naturalistic respectability imposed by 
the first kind of naturalism in ethics. I have also argued, however, that naturalistic 
definitions such as Railton‟s may be acceptable were naturalists to drop this condition 
and espouse the second, less demanding, form of naturalism. Finally, I have suggested 
that this methodological revision may be consistent with the underlying motivations 
for naturalism, as given by Railton. These conclusions do not entail that the first type 
of naturalism in ethics is misguided, but they do entail that those who find Railton‟s 
account of moral properties appealing would do better to become naturalists of the 
second kind.
28
 
 
“Two Kinds of Naturalism in Ethics” – Neil Sinclair 
 32 
References 
 
Blackburn, S., Just Causes, Philosophical Studies 61(1) (1991), pp.3-17. 
 
Blackburn, S., Circles, Finks, Smells and Biconditionals in Tomberlin, J. (ed.) 
Philosophical Perspectives 7: Language and Logic. California: Ridgeview, 1993, 
pp.259-279.  
 
Boyd, R., How to be a Moral Realist, in Sayre-McCord, G. (ed.) Essays on Moral 
Realism. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1988, pp.181-228.  
 
Brink, D.O., Moral Realism and the Foundations of Ethics. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1989. 
 
Majors, B., Moral Explanation and the Special Sciences, Philosophical Studies 113(2) 
(2003), pp.121-152. 
 
McDowell, J., Values and Secondary Qualities, in Honderich, T. (ed.) Morality and 
Objectivity, Boston: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1985, pp.110-129.  
 
Nagel, T., The Limits of Objectivity, in McMurrin, S. (ed.) The Tanner Lectures on 
Human Values I. Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press, 1980, pp. 75-139.  
 
Nozick, R., Philosophical Explanations. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1981. 
 
“Two Kinds of Naturalism in Ethics” – Neil Sinclair 
 33 
Railton, P., Moral Realism, Philosophical Review 95(2) (1986), pp.163-207. 
 
Railton, P., Naturalism and Prescriptivity, Social Philosophy and Policy  7(1) (1989), 
pp. 151-174. 
 
Railton, P., Moral Explanation and Moral Objectivity, Philosophy and  
Phenomenological Research 58(1) (1998), pp. 175-82. 
 
Sturgeon, N., Moral Explanations, in Copp, D. and Zimmerman, D. (eds.) Morality, 
Reason and Truth. Totowa, N.J.: Rowman & Allanheld, 1985, pp.49-78.  
 
Sturgeon, N. What Difference Does it Make if Moral Realism is True?,  
Southern Journal of Philosophy, supp. vol. 24,1986, pp. 115-142. 
 
Wiggins, D., Moral Cognitivism, Moral Relativism and Motivating Moral  
Beliefs, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 91 (1990), pp. 61-86. 
NOTES 
 
1
 See, for example, Sturgeon (1985), Railton (1986), Brink (1989) and Majors (2003). A distinct issue 
is whether the availability of moral explanations of this sort suffices to show that moral properties 
exist. For this latter debate, see Sturgeon (1986) and Blackburn (1991).  
2
 For ease of reading I assume an events-based ontology, though my arguments do not depend on it.  
3
 The explanations I have in mind are common in the literature:  “Children thrive when treated with 
decency and humanity” and “The revolution was a result of the injustices suffered by the working 
classes”. See Sturgeon (1986).  
4
 The rejection of the explanatory condition is more commonly associated with non-naturalistic moral 
realists: see Nagel (1980) and McDowell (1985).  
 
“Two Kinds of Naturalism in Ethics” – Neil Sinclair 
 34 
 
5
 One further caveat: since explanation is transitive, and since the making of moral judgements can 
often explain other non-moral events (such as agents‟ actions), even the second type of naturalist will 
concede that moral properties can participate, indirectly, in explanations of non-moral events other than 
the making of moral judgements. But the first type of naturalist demands further that moral 
explanations of such events sometimes be direct, in the sense that they do not transmit through the 
making of moral judgements. This is why I choose as my examples moral explanations that are not 
easily considered elliptical for explanations involving the making of moral judgements. See Blackburn 
(1991). 
6
 Railton (1986). Subsequent numbers in brackets are page references to this paper.  
7
 Railton (1989, pp.155-6). 
8
 Railton (1998, p.179). 
9
 Railton (1998,  p.180). 
10
 Sturgeon (1986) shares this deference to empirical discovery and, like Railton, is optimistic that such 
explanations will be forthcoming.  
11
 See Miller (2003, p.197). 
12
 Note that subjective and objectified subjective interests of agents are (actual or hypothetical) desires 
of the agent whereas objective interests are features of the agents‟ situation. Railton notes (175, n.16) 
that in the latter case „interest‟ is not a happy term and suggests that „positive-valence-making 
characteristic‟ may be a more accurate expression. 
13
 See, for example, Blackburn (1993). Note that this characterisation of response-dependence accounts 
entails no particular view about the status of proposed biconditional equivalence. Following Blackburn 
(ibid.), we may distinguish three uses to which such a proposal may be put: an a priori analysis of the 
concept appearing on the left-hand side of the biconditional; an elucidation of the logic of the same 
concept and an a posteriori identification of the property specified on the left-hand side with the 
property specified on the right-hand side. Railton‟s position is most similar to the third approach, 
although by treating his a posteriori identification as a reforming definition he avoids the possible 
problems raised by seeming to offer a contingent identity statement.  
14
 As Blackburn points out (1993) the distinction between those conditions that are part of P and those 
that are part of C is somewhat arbitrary.  
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15
 Strictly speaking, the reference to ideally instrumentally rational and fully informed agents is 
unnecessary, since Railton‟s view can be expressed in terms of the deliverances of the decision 
procedure that such agents would employ. The agent-based interpretation of Railton is common (see, 
for example Miller 2003 p.196), but the use of it here is not necessary for the argument, since the 
distinctions I draw below between dispositional and categorical interpretations of Railton‟s view would 
apply whether the dispositions concerned are those of instrumentally rational agents or of their decision 
procedures. 
16
 I use the term „categorical ground‟ to refer to those properties in virtue of which objects possess 
specified dispositional properties. The term is not intended to prejudge any metaphysical issues as to 
the nature (dispositional or otherwise) of these underlying properties.  
17
 Note a parallel here with objectified subjective and objective interests. Claims about objectified 
subjective interests are made true by dispositional facts (facts about what idealised counterparts would 
want the non-idealised agent to want) whereas claims about objective interests are made true by 
categorical facts (facts that make it the case that these dispositional facts obtain). Railton identifies 
facts about non-moral goodness with the latter (176), but gives no indication that a similar view is 
intended for the case of moral facts. In any case, my argument is that neither identification satisfies 
Railton‟s criterion of naturalistic respectability.  
18
 Other naturalists fond of this example include Brink (1989) and Sturgeon (1985, 1986).  
19
 Railton goes on to claim that “the discontent produced by departures from social rationality may 
produce feedback that, at a social level, promotes the development of norms that better approximate 
social rationality” (193). In other words, if explanations such as (A) are acceptable, the instantiation of 
moral wrongness may play a wider role in the explanation of processes of social change. However, 
since I reject explanations such as (A) I also reject any such wider explanatory role. 
20
 By „directly‟ I simply mean not acting through some causal intermediary. 
21
 Railton (1989 p.161).  
22
 Dispositional accounts of moral properties are not uncommon. See for example, [[]]. These authors 
are less clear in whether they would accept the condition imposed by the first kind of naturalism. 
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23
 Due to lack of space, the other option – that of maintaining the explanatory condition whilst 
abandoning a dispositional account of moral properties – will not be discussed here. See Sturgeon 
(1985, 1986). 
24
 It is an interesting question – not addressed here – which of these options Railton would himself 
prefer (assuming, of course, he accepts the arguments of §6). My hunch is that he is more attached to 
the explanatory condition on naturalistic respectability than the particular definitions he offers; but this 
is only a hunch. In any case, my arguments have shown that Railton cannot have both. 
25
 See also Railton (1989 p.161, 1998 p.175) and Boyd (1988).   
26
 Wiggins (1990). 
27
 Nozick (1981). 
28
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